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26 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Fubini on the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO)

1. Dr. Fubini conferred with me at my house, arriving at 0800 on 24 July for breakfast. He opened the discussion by saying that there appeared to be a total impasse on two major points: one being the provisions relating to the allocation of responsibility for development of new systems, and the other being the role of the Executive Committee. I said that I agreed with Dr. Fubini and that any discussion of the subsidiary provisions of the agreement would be a waste of time in the absence of an understanding on these two points.

2. I said that it seemed to me that there had been a considerable retrenchment on the part of the Defense Department on the subject of the role of the Executive Committee. I said that I had the impression from the two conversations which I had with Mr. Vance and one meeting with Mr. McNamara that the Defense Department was prepared to concede duality of responsibility as between the DCI and Secretary of Defense for policy guidance and control of the program. Now, apparently, the DoD position was that the Executive Committee should be relegated to the status of consultants or advisors to the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Fubini countered with the charge that CIA had agreed to an arrangement under which the NRO would be responsible for development of all new systems. He claimed that we had retreated from this position. I said that the Director was ready to go a long way to meet Mr. Vance's desires in this respect but wanted to have his own views, as to the best arrangements for development, clearly understood. The issue of the Executive Committee was, in my opinion, non-negotiable.

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NRO review(s)
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3. The basic problem as it emerged in our discussion was how to provide the DCI with adequate participation in both the control and in the activities of the program to enable him effectively to influence the policy of the program and preserve its integrity for intelligence purposes. An adequate voice in the Executive Committee seemed to be essential for this purpose. Dr. Fubini indicated an understanding of this problem. He said that Mr. McNamara's concern was with an arrangement which might involve, or appear to involve, appeals on relatively minor issues to the President. He suggested first an arrangement under which Clark Clifford and the Secretary of Defense would be added to the Committee. As it seems unlikely that Mr. Clifford would wish to participate actively in the Executive Committee, Dr. Fubini then suggested that McGeorge Bundy might be added. The thought here was that Mr. Bundy would serve as a member of the Executive Committee but would not attend meetings, unless some important issue was in disagreement. This seemed to me a cumbersome and not particularly attractive arrangement and I finally agreed to recommend the present wording of the draft agreement. This provides, in essence, that the Secretary of Defense will resolve an issue on which the Executive Committee cannot agree after a hearing. This appears to me a satisfactory arrangement for a number of reasons:

a. The DCI in any event has the right of appeal to the President via the National Security Council on matters where intelligence interests relating to the national security appear to be involved.

b. The agreement guarantees that the Secretary of Defense will act on a given matter only after a full discussion with the DCI and the Special Assistant for S&T. This is quite different from earlier proposed arrangements under which power to act and make decisions was delegated by the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the Program, to the DNRO.

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c. Although in theory this gives the Secretary of Defense the power to overrule decisions taken by a majority of the Executive Committee, he probably has this power anyway -- at least to the extent of suspending action with which he disagrees. In any event he would, I think, use it judiciously and sparingly if at all.

As part of this arrangement, Dr. Fubini agreed that the Secretary of Defense would not be designated the Executive Agent for the Program.



4. On the development issue, Dr. Fubini maintained that his concern was preventing the creation of "a new space agency." Therefore, he felt that the important thing is to limit the development of spacecraft, boosters, and reentry vehicles to the Air Force, acting under NRO supervision. No restriction is placed on the allocation of responsibility for the development of new sensors.

5. As regards the SOC, it was agreed to postpone any final recommendation. Dr. Fubini seemed to be sympathetic to an arrangement under which the SOC would be staffed by CIA personnel or "COMOR types," as he put it, and function under the immediate supervision of the DDNRO. He said, incidentally, that the DCI had indicated agreement to an arrangement along these lines.

6. A number of miscellaneous items were mentioned:

a. DoD insists on the DNRO being an official of the Air Force.

b.  should be developed by the NRO.

c.  should not be done at all and therefore, according to Dr. Fubini, there is no point in discussing who should do it. He claims to have cancelled an Air Force contract for development along lines similar to . He thinks that we exaggerate the importance of telemetry as the source of intelligence on missile conformation.



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(On this point he believes that [redacted] is both feasible and a better answer to the problem.) He recognizes, however, [redacted] collection and would support [redacted] for this purpose.

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d. There was no discussion of manned aircraft programs.

/s/ John A. Bross

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D/DCI/NIPE

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